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Abstract 
This dissertation, written as part of the EMBA at the International Hellenic University, explores 
the rationale for the creation of a non-for-profit organisation that supports innovation 
business ecosystems in Greece and southeast Europe. It also determines whether and under 
what conditions such an entity could be financially and operationally sustainable.  
First, it is confirmed that Greece and its northern neighbours constitute a distinctly 
disadvantaged region. On the one hand, the social, economic, and legal infrastructure is 
markedly unfavourable to entrepreneurial innovation. On the other, when several 
performance dimensions are considered, the countries’ actual performance is indicated as 
modest at best. Then, reasonable objectives for an organisation that would work towards 
mitigating the hardships innovative ventures face are determined: potential innovators can 
be educated and inspired towards acquiring an entrepreneurial culture, young people can be 
better prepared for a workplace that features both challenges and opportunities, and policies 
can better reflect the needs of the innovation-driven markets of today and tomorrow. Lastly, 
it is demonstrated that the studied organisation can be sustainable, provided a moderate 
upfront funding is supplied by either its founders or a third party such as a financial institution.   
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Korina Katsaliaki and Dr. Stavroula Laspita who was 
responsible for monitoring my day-to-day progress, for the patient guidance they willingly 
provided throughout the writing process. I am also very grateful to the renowned experts that 
validated or questioned my views. I thank (in alphabetical order) Thanasis Kalekos, Giorgos 
Lemonis, Angelos Manglis, and Argyris Spiridis.  
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1. Methodology  
1.1 Approach 
This study is about the rationale and feasibility of the establishment of an organisation that 
will support innovative ventures in Greece and across south-east Europe. It has been 
structured in line with the author’s expertise in supporting for-profit (mostly) and not-for-
profit (less so) startups develop their own business plans. The methodology emphases the 
importance of formulating a meticulous problem statement1. The study is arranged in the 
following main parts: 
a. The organisation’s mission and vision statements.  
b. The problem - customer and market analysis. The problem can be articulated as follows: 
what, if any, are the problems that make the establishment for the proposed social enterprise 
desirable? The question will be answered through a literature review and interviews. This 
assessment is essential for the further development of the study, and will constitute a 
substantial part of it. It will be completed with an analysis of the internal and external factors 
(i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats [SWOT]) that affect Greece’s innovation 
ecosystem.    
c. The solution - services to end users. A pairing of internal and external factors (see above) 
will lead to the formulation of the organisation’s goals regarding the fulfilment of its mission. 
Again, inputs from interviews will be used to validate or question any conclusions reached. 
The definition of the organisational goals will lead to a formulation of indicative activities it 
will engage in.  
d. Implementation. Here, the resources needed will be estimated; also, the economic and 
operational feasibility of the venture will be evaluated, and a specific course of action will be 
proposed. This section includes a funding plan, an operation plan and a communication plan. 
The analysis will span a five-year period.   
                                                     
1 In a startup context, the problem statement is a description of the social, economic, or environmental problem 
to be solved.  
8 
 
e. Financial projections. This section addresses the main sustainability issue: can the venture 
be financially sustainable? A pro forma statement of cash flow will determine capital 
requirements that will ensure its financial viability. The analysis will span a five-year period.   
f. Conclusions  
1.2 Sources  
Secondary sources 
In part, the study relied on a literature review/desk research, using various providers of 
information, including:     
• search engines, including Google, Google scholar, CiteSeerX, the PubMed, Science 
Direct, the Directory of Open Access Journals,    
• the websites of the European Commission, the Global Enterpreneurship Monitor, 
OECD, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, 
• the ResearchGate forum, 
• IHU MBA courses’ material, 
etc.  
Search using Google’s generic search engine was conducted in both the Greek and English 
language. All other searches were conducted in the English language.  
For an assessment of the current situation and the competition, certain keywords were used 
in conjunction including “innovation”, “innovators”, “entrepreneurship”, “skills”, “education”, 
“European Commission” “policies”, “initiatives”, “Greece” “Albania”, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, “Bulgaria”, “FYROM”, “Montenegro”, “Romania”, “Serbia”, and others.        
Primary sources  
Primary sources include key individuals and prominent members of the Greek innovation 
ecosystem. Semi-structured interviews were conducted by telephone and in person. The 
Greek language was used in all instances. A transcription of the interviews translated in English 
appears in Appendix A.  A very short profile of the interviewees is provided below: 
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Mr. Thanasis Kalekos, is one of Greece’s best-known venture capitalists. Mr. Kalekos is a 
Managing Partner of Odyssey Venture Partners2, a venture capital fund focusing on early-
stage IT ventures originating in Greece. He has thirty years of venture capital and executive 
management experience. 
Mr. Giorgos Lemonis is a serial entrepreneur and an expert on startup strategy. To date, he 
counts two successful exits. He has repeateadly contributed to the annual “Doing Business” 
report of The World Bank, he is a columnist, a mentor of several startups, and the creator of 
the Callibrie application3.  
Mr. Angelos Manglis gave this interview with his capacity as the co-founder and facilitator of 
the Hellenic Mobile Cluster4, a cluster of the largest Greek companies involved in the 
development of mobile applications.  
Mr. Argyris Spyridis has more than two decades of experience as a coach and a mentor for 
startups and SMEs. He is a co-founder of Innovation Farm5, providing support to startups. He 
is active in the StageOne Accelerator for early/idea stage startups, the StageTwo Accelerator, 
an accelerator focusing on market strategy and access to finance, Mentor’s mix, a programme 
for training new mentors that will support the innovation ecosystem, Thessaloniki Innohub, 
ICT2B, the SuperFounders, and the Balkan Venture Forum’s Venture Academy.   
2. Mission and vision statement for the envisaged organisation  
My assessment for the need for this project was formulated during my work as a consultant 
in Greek consulting firms. Innovative ventures originating in Greece rarely have the chance to 
acquire capital, advance their innovative product or service, and fulfil their potential. Most 
notably, startups and innovative SMEs have a challenging time drawing the attention of both 
institutional investors (different types of providers of risk capital) and potential strategic 
investors (larger and established corporations operating in a relevant industry). For years, I 
have been confronted with a sense of futility stemming from failing efforts to support 
                                                     
2 https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/odyssey-venture-partners.   
3 http://beta.callibrie.com/.  
4 http://www.hamac.gr/default90c3.html?lang=en-GB&page=2  
5 http://innovationfarm.eu/.  
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individual startups and innovative SMEs. Hence, more recently, I have been considering the 
idea of establishing an organisation that would, instead, focus on (a) the underlying problems 
and (b) on the macro-level. In terms of geographical coverage, it would focus on southeast 
European (SEE) countries. However, Greece will be the initial and primary target-country: my 
own experience with Greece’s hardships is one of the driving forces for undertaking this 
venture; my firm confidence on the ability of the Greek human capital to excel in developing 
successful enterprises and world-class innovations is another. 
Public benefit purpose entities emerge when the current approaches to important societal 
challenges are inadequate. Market forces and state interventions have been unable to sustain 
entrepreneurship and innovation at acceptable levels within the defined geographical areas 
of interest. Further, non-governmental organisations and initiatives have not been especially 
active or effective in confronting these shortcomings. The proposed social enterprise is 
intended to make up for this gap. Its ambition is best described in its mission and vision 
statements that follow. 
Table 1. The organisation’s mission and vision statements. 
Working 
(provisional) 
organisation 
name  
EI (entrepreneurship and innovation) 
 
Mission 
statement 
 
EI is Greece’s organisation for entrepreneurship and innovation. Through 
our networks and always in partnership with others, we work to unleash 
the hidden potential of innovative entrepreneurship in Greece, southeast 
Europe, and the European Union. To do that, we implement capacity 
building activities aiming at researchers, innovators, risk-tolerant investors, 
local and state authorities, and the public; we help young people make 
informed career choices in a complicated and changing world; and we 
support policy makers in improving the legislative and financial 
environment for pioneering and ambitious business ventures.  
 
EI strives to avoid becoming inward looking. Innovation is not a local issue. 
Nor does it concern only a fortunate elite of wealthy individuals and large 
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corporations. Therefore, we use multiple communication channels to reach 
out and engage people in our vision for an economy that provides ample 
opportunities for personal fulfilment, and is more vibrant, environmentally 
conscious, and socially inclusive.   
Vision 
statement 
 
We envision the bottom-up transformation of our society towards a 
paradigm that is economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable. EI 
will be an important part of this process through its support to 
entrepreneurship and innovation.   
The study starts with an assumption of what the overarching goal of the organisation should 
be: to support entrepreneurship and innovation in Greece and across SEE. Sections to follow 
assess the rationale and feasibility of this goal. In sections 5 and 5.2, this overarching goal is 
analysed to more substantiated and specific goals and indicative activities. The following list 
is provided to give the reader a picture of what kind of activities/services EI could engage 
in/provide: 
• Organisation of conferences and roundtables for the discussion of institutional 
improvements;  
• Publishing of reports recording the state of play and proposing public intervention 
measures; 
• Organisation of pitching events introducing startups to investors; 
• Organisation of educational workshops that encourage students, researchers and 
young professionals to adopt a positive approach to entrepreneurship; 
etc.  
The venture will spin-off from the consulting firm Atlantis Consulting6, located in Thessaloniki, 
Greece – the firm I currently work for. It will borrow Atlantis’ 25-year-long expertise on the 
Greek entrepreneurial ecosystem and leverage its Greek, SEE, and European networks.  This 
                                                     
6 http://www.atlantisresearch.gr/  
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genetic relationship with an established consulting firm is intended to support the financial 
sustainability and operational capacity of IE during its start-up period.   
3. Introduction to relevant concepts and perspectives  
This section provides a brief introduction to concepts and ideas that are used throughout this 
study. For a further analysis, the reader is referred to the bibliographical sources.  
3.1 Entrepreneurship and innovation  
For Low & MacMillan (1988) entrepreneurship is simply the creation a new enterprise. 
However, the analyses that follows adopts the view that entrepreneurship and innovation are 
closely related (see Rwigema and Venter, 2004; Rumelt, 1987). In plain terms, this perspective 
can be formulated as follows: entrepreneurship is the creation of a new business venture that 
is in some way(s) innovative.  
Innovation “is the introduction of something new” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). In a business 
context, innovation is typically associated with the creation of value, and social and economic 
impacts (see Reisman, 2004). Intrinsically, innovation is an elusive, transcendent, and 
emergent phenomenon, not easily cultivated or identified (see Arena, Cross, Sims, & Uhl-Bien, 
2017).     
3.2 The helix models of innovation  
The helix models of innovation provide a framework for the interpretation of socio-economic 
development in knowledge societies. The triple helix model, introduced by Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff in 1995, emphases the role of interactions between universities, the industry, and 
governments for the production, transfer, and application of knowledge. This interaction 
supports innovation and causes the enhancement, through the co-evolution, co-specialisation 
and co-opetition, of the socio-economic pillars (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009). Therefore, if 
favourable conditions apply, a virtuous circle emerges that can stimulate innovation and 
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growth, while enriching and strengthening both these entrepreneurial ecosystem 
constituents and the ecosystem as a whole (Etzkowitz, 2005; Leydesdorff & Ivanova, 2016)7.  
The role of entrepreneurship in the production of marketable innovation  
Entrepreneurship is a mediator for the widespread application of innovation beyond research 
centres. One of the main points that Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff make is that the fostering of 
academic entrepreneurship and the development of links between academia and the industry 
are vital steps towards promoting innovation in a knowledge-based society. In fact, they 
propose that the “entrepreneurial university” is a natural development of its traditional core 
activities, namely, teaching and research. According to Stanford University’s Triple Helix 
Research Group (2017), 
Students are not only the new generations of professionals in various scientific disciplines, 
business, culture etc., but they can also be trained and encouraged to become 
entrepreneurs and firm founders, contributing to economic growth and job creation in a 
society that needs such outcomes more than ever. Moreover, entrepreneurial universities 
are also extending their capabilities of educating individuals to educating organizations, 
through entrepreneurship and incubation programmes and new training modules at 
venues such as inter-disciplinary centres, science parks, academic spin-offs, incubators 
and venture capital firms.  
The quadruple helix model  
In 2009, Carayannis and Campbell proposed the quadruple helix model of innovation, which 
introduced one more helix to the model. This fourth helix, described in short as “the public”, 
is associated with civil society, art, culture, the creative industries, values, the media, etc. 
(Carayannis, Barth & Campbell, 2012). The quadruple helix model encourages the knowledge 
society rather than the knowledge economy perspective, which, in the author’s view, 
permeated the previous, three-helix model. A quadruple helix system, which encompasses 
the notions of open, user-driven, and participative innovation, can only be established as part 
                                                     
7 The helix models are compatible with and complementary to the endogenous growth theory (see Romer, 1994) 
which stresses the role of positive spill over effects of investments in human capital and innovation in a 
knowledge economy context.  
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of a democratic social contract (Carayannis & Campbell, 2014). The quadruple helix model will 
be the prevailing theoretical framework used in this study.     
Applications of the helix models  
The insights produced through the helix models have contributed significantly to policy 
making. The triple helix concept has been used repeatedly as conceptual basis for the 
formulation of innovation policies in different parts of the world (Soldi, Cavallini, Friedl & 
Volpe, 2016, p. 7). The European Commission used the quadruple helix model as a reference 
approach for the development of the EU’s Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart 
Specialisation (RIS 3; European Commission, 2012; see also Höglund & Linton, 2017). 
3.3 Rationale for undertaking an economic social entrepreneurship venture 
A question that ought to be addressed is the rationale for a not-for-profit organisation to 
intervene in the way markets function. An advocate of neo-classical economic theory (the 
established economic view, see Weintraub (2007) for an overview) might legitimately 
question the appropriateness and effectiveness of such an approach. Indeed, wouldn’t market 
forces be sufficient to support innovation? Doesn’t the market compensate innovators by the 
competitive advantage innovative products/services give them?  
The answer is that market imperfections or failures do exist (Munday, 2000). One way to study 
them is through the concept of positive externalities (Pigou, 1920). Positive externalities are 
effects that stem from economic transactions, and demonstrate the following two distinctive 
features:  
a. They reach beyond the transacting parties, positively affecting the economy and/or 
society (positive spill over effect). 
b. The transacting parties are unable to monetise (i.e. make a profit out of) them fully.  
In other words, there are things that market participants do or could do that, clearly, are not 
compensated enough by the market when their respective social and economic impact is 
considered. In our case, innovative enterprises promote growth, jobs, and people’s welfare to 
an extent that cannot be captured by their market value. This is so because research, 
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development and innovation (RDI) contributes to the public body of knowledge and promotes 
further discoveries and positive societal developments (Helbling, 2010).  
This problem is exacerbated by the high fixed costs associated with assessing the financial 
needs of startup and small-firm innovators, given the average anticipated financial return 
(Barbaroux, 2014). In large part, the lack of quality information about smaller and younger 
ventures accounts for this. Startups and scaleups cannot provide a long track record, have no 
or limited collateral, and their management teams may not have had the chance to 
demonstrate their abilities. These barriers to quality information can affect the financing 
providers’ behaviour. The aggregate result is insufficient supply of private capital towards 
innovation, on the macro-level (Kraemer-Eis, Signore & Prencipe, 2016, p. 9).  
3.4 The envisaged entity: possible forms and characteristics  
According to Santos (2009) social enterprises are rational means of addressing market failures 
that governments also fail to tackle: “I define the distinctive domain of social entrepreneurship 
as addressing neglected positive externalities” (p. 337). This is a more inclusive and more 
usable concept of social entrepreneurship compared to definitions that focus solely on 
activities providing aid to disadvantaged parts of the population (Certo & Miller, 2008). The 
approach of social enterprises to social challenges can be a fruitful complement to 
government intervention, through a leveraging of entrepreneurial skills and private-sector 
mentality (Phills & Denend, 2005).  
Elkington and Hartigan (2008) distinguish between three types of social enterprises: leveraged 
not-for-profit ventures, hybrid not-for-profit ventures, and social business ventures. The 
following table (Lopez-Claros, 2010, p. 72), summarises the legal/financial categories of social 
enterprises that support innovation using the insights of both Elkington and Hartigan, and 
Santos. 
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Table 2. Legal and financial characteristics of different types of social enterprises (Lopez-Claros, 2010, 
p. 72). 
Legal / 
financial 
types 
Characteristics 
Leveraged non-
for-profit 
ventures 
Addresses positive externalities not addressed adequately 
Engages wide cross-sections of society to stimulate innovation through 
a multiplier effect 
Depends on outside funding for survival 
Sustainability relies on the commitment of a wide array of 
private/public sector actors to organization's mission and objectives 
Hybrid non-for-
profit ventures 
Addresses positive externalities not addressed adequately 
The business model stipulates partial cost recovery by selling goods 
and services 
Sustainability achieved through a combination of different revenue 
sources such as private and government grants, debt, and self-
generated revenues  
Social business 
ventures 
Addresses positive externalities not addressed adequately 
A for-profit entity that promotes transformational change 
Uses financial incentives (profits) as a means to an end. The 
overarching goal is the promotion of the social mission. 
Sustainability relies on investors attracted by the possibility of 
generating financial as well as social return 
The envisaged social organisation will support the entrepreneurial innovation process on the 
basis of the quadruple helix model presented in section 3.2. The organisation itself, a social 
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enterprise, can be considered as part of the fourth helix (civil society). Using a quadruple helix 
model perspective, its role is twofold:  
To help the development of links between the helixes. It will engage in an effort to enhance 
connections among the model’s socio-economic pillars, focusing principally on encouraging 
the development of meaningful bottom-up links (innovators-government, investors-
government, and society-government).  
To support key constituents of the helix ecosystem. This includes the human capital; 
innovative startups; early-stage, risk tolerant investors (business angels); development state 
or regional agencies, etc.  
4. The problem: customer and market analysis 
4.1 Geographical coverage of the organisation’s operations 
To put this venture into perspective, its goals, in terms of geographical coverage, should first 
be defined. Greece is its starting point and main focal point, at least during its first years of 
operation. Nevertheless, soon after its establishment, by capitalising on its parent company’s 
networks and connections, it will also pursue to engage in cross-border projects. These 
projects are intended to focus mostly in the SEE region. The organisation’s natural way of 
expanding, in the geographical sense, will involve the implementation of projects of wider 
geographical coverage. The EU will be the enterprise’s horizon8. The EU will also lend the 
organisation its socio-economical conceptual framework, so that the latter will be compatible 
with – and readily able to participate in – EU initiatives and funding schemes.  
                                                     
8 Horizon is here to be understood as corresponding to the concept of the “total addressable market” used within 
for-profit contexts. 
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Figure 1. The geographical focus of the organisation. 
4.2 Greece as the primary target market 
The organisation will mainly focus on the Greek entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystem. 
Right from the start, it is intended that it will possess adequate organisational knowledge to 
serve its mission regarding this country. Its headquarters will be located in Thessaloniki, 
Greece. An analysis of the situation regarding entrepreneurship and innovation in Greece 
follows.   
European Commission’s European Innovation Scoreboard  
In Greece, the lingering financial crisis has put the need for improved entrepreneurial 
innovation performance in the spotlight. Despite the high-profile pronouncements and setting 
up of initiatives, however, the results have been poor. According to the latest European 
Commission’s European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2017a), the official 
and authoritative source for information about innovation performance across the EU, Greece 
remains a below-EU-average innovator. Greece ranked 21st amongst a total of 28 EU countries, 
lagging former communist countries such as Estonia and Slovakia (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. “Coloured columns show Member States’ performance in 2016, using the most recent data 
for 27 indicators, relative to that of the EU in 2010 [i.e. EU 2010 value equals 100 -Ed.]. The 
horizontal hyphens show performance in 2015, using the next most recent data for 27 indicators, 
relative to that of the EU in 2010. Grey columns show Member States’ performance in 2010 relative 
to that of the EU in 2010. For all years the same measurement methodology has been used. The 
dashed lines show the threshold values between the performance groups in 2016, comparing 
Member States’ performance in 2016 relative to that of the EU in 2016.” (European Commission, 
2017a, p. 14).  
The EIS uses data from Eurostat and other established sources9, to reach conclusions for 
Member State’s and EU as a whole capacity to innovate. The total score is a composite of ten 
innovation dimensions (i.e. components or aspects), which, in turn, are computed as weighted 
averages of several indicators. A summary of the findings concerning Greece is presented in 
Table 3.  
                                                     
9 This includes the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.   
20 
 
Table 3. A summary of Greece’s European Innovation Scoreboard performance for 2016 (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 14-18; European Commission, 
2017b).  
 Innovation dimension 
(100 is EU in 2010; % 
comparisons made 
against Greece in 
2010) 
Respective indicators (100 is EU in 2010; % comparisons made 
against Greece in 2010)  
Comments 
1
. F
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
1.1 Human resources: 
86.4, +34.8%  
1.1.1 New doctorate graduates: 71.2, +25.0%. This is a measure 
of PhD graduates within the 25 to 34 year-old segment of the 
population. 
1.1.2 Population aged 25-34 with tertiary education: 150.7, 
+68.4% 
1.1.3 Lifelong learning: 29.5, +7.4%. This is a measure of the 
supply of advanced skills within the 25 to 34 age group.  
A notable, positive correlation between Human resources 
and overall ranking was reported.  Greece’s improvement 
is the fifth highest among the Member States.  
1.2 Attractive research 
systems: 100.9, 
+15.1% 
1.2.1 International scientific co-publications: 187.4, +66.7%. 
This is measure of the number scientists that have co-authored 
a publication with non-EU country residents.  
1.2.2 Top 10% most cited publications: 84.2, +3.1%  
1.2.3 Foreign doctorate students (N/A) 
Greece’s performance is only slightly below EU average 
(EU’s overall score for 2016 is 102), mostly due to a high 
score for indicator 1.2.1. However, since data for 
indicator 1.2.3 is missing, the overall score for this 
innovation dimension may not be indicative.      
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1.3 Innovation-friendly 
environment: 33.6, -
6.0% 
1.3.1 Broadband penetration (for enterprises): 22.2, +0.0% 
1.3.2 Opportunity-driven entrepreneurship: 41.7, -10.2% This 
indicator uses the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
distinction between opportunity-driven entrepreneurship and 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship, as well as relevant data 
provided by the same source.  
Greece is the bottom of the list among all Member 
States. The EU average has increased by 14.3% 
since 2016, mostly due to an increased broadband 
penetration: 1.3.1 has increased by +44% while 1.3.2 has 
decreased by7%.   
2
. I
n
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
2.1 Finance and 
support: 47.3, +19.8 
2.1.1 Research and development (R&D) expenditure in the 
public sector: 84.0, +42.6%.  
2.1.2 Venture capital expenditures: 1.0, -90.0%. This indicator 
measures private equity raised for early-stage, expansion and 
replacement investments, using data from Invest Europe.  
 
Notably, indicator 2.1.1 is telling of the collapse in 
venture capital activity in Greece.   
2.2. Firm investments: 
65.3, +4.0% 
2.2.1 R&D expenditure in the business sector (percentage of 
GDP): 25.3 +7.7%  
2.2.2 Non-R&D innovation expenditures (percentage of 
turnover): 109.3, +3.9%. This indicator uses the results of a 
survey made by Eurostat called Community Innovation Survey. 
It considers innovation expenditure excluding that for R&D. 
2.2.3 Enterprises providing training to develop or upgrade ICT 
skills of their personnel (percentage of SMEs): 71.4, +0.0% 
Since 2010, firm investments has improved across the EU 
by 13.6%. Not surprisingly, Greek firms have not been 
able to fully keep up to this trend. Non-R&D innovation 
expenditures remain among the lowest between all 
Member States.  
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3.1 Innovators: 101.2, 
-20.1% 
3.1.1 SMEs with product or process innovations (percentage of 
SMEs): 97.7, -11.6% 
3.1.2 SMEs with marketing or organisational innovations 
(percentage of SMEs): 100.7, -38.8% 
3.1.3 SMEs innovating in-house (percentage of SMEs): 105.3, -
9.4% 
Although the have limited resources at their disposal (see 
previous innovation dimension), Greek firms innovate 
more than the current EU average (EU 2016=86), 
according to their own statements. The trend, however, 
is a negative one. Arguably, firms are becoming less able 
and/or willing to commit resources towards different 
ways of innovating within the current economic 
environment (-20.1% since 2010).    
3.2 Linkages: 82.3, 
+3.7% 
3.2.1 Innovative SMEs collaborating with others (percentage of 
SMEs): 136.0, +14.5%. Measures the co-operation agreements 
concerning innovation activities with other firms or other 
organisations in the past three years.   
3.2.2 Public-private co-authored research publications (per 
million population): 39.3, -14.6%. It is a measure of public-
private linkages concerning research activities.  
3.2.3 Private co-funding of public R&D expenditures 
(percentage of GDP): 75.3, +10.6%. Measures R&D expenditures 
in the public sector financed by private firms.  
Greece’s performance on linkages has marginally 
improved since 2010. In contrast, EU performance has 
increased by 14 percentage points during the same 
period. 
  
23 
 
3.3 Intellectual assets: 
42.9, +20.3% 
3.3.1 PCT patent applications per billion GDP: 38.3, +5.3% 
3.3.2 Trademark applications per billion GDP: 70.0, +49.2% 
3.3.3 Design applications per billion GDP: 28.2, +18.3%. This 
indicator measures the number of applications submitted to the 
EU’s Intellectual Property Office. 
Notably, Greece scores below 50% of current EU score.  
Note that this is a measure of the capacity of enterprises 
to develop new products – it does not look at national 
IPR policies as a framework condition.  
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4.1 Employment 
impacts: 70.3, +13.0% 
4.1.1 Employment in knowledge-intensive activities (percentage 
of total employment): 83.3, +15.4% 
4.1.2 Employment in fast-growing enterprises of innovative 
sectors (percentage of total employment): N/A 
Since data for indicator 4.1.2 is missing, the score for this 
innovation dimension as a whole may not be indicative.      
4.2 Sales impacts: 
50.7, -39.0% 
4.2.1 Medium and high-tech product exports: 10.6, -10.4% 
4.2.2 Knowledge-intensive services exports: 54.2, -33.9% 
4.2.3 Sales of new-to-market and new-to-firm product 
innovations: 95.0, -79.6% This indicator considers both products 
that are new to the market and new to the firm.  
Greece has had the highest rate of decrease in 
performance among all Member States since 2010. 
Greece has almost reached pre-crisis levels of total 
exports in 2016, mostly due to the enhancement of its 
price competitiveness ((Anastasatos et al., 2017, p. 7). 
The sharp decrease in 4.2.3, which indicates an increase 
in conservatism in terms of marketing new products, is 
not explained in the EIS report; its interpretation would 
require further analysis. A study of the former EIS reports 
reveals that the decrease occurred after 2012 (European 
Commission, n.d.-a).  
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The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  
Other studies have reached similar results. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (n.d.-a) uses 
a generalised interpretation of the concept of entrepreneurship that includes both innovative 
and non-innovative ventures. However, in innovation-led economies, such as the Greek 
economy (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, n.d.-b), innovation and entrepreneurship are 
more often than not intertwined (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016, p.27). A list of some 
of the most interesting findings of recent reports follows: 
1. Greece shows the lowest level of entrepreneurial opportunity perceptions among all 
64 countries that participated in the 2016 survey (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 
2016, p.20). 
2. The media provides relatively low exposure to positive representations of 
entrepreneurship (39%; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016, p.19).  
3. Interestingly, however, the majority of working age adults (64%) believe that 
entrepreneurship is a good career choice (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016, 
p.19).   
4. Intentions for undertaking entrepreneurial activities are low, below 10% (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016, p.20).   
5. Greeks consistently show a particularly high level of fear of failure concerning starting 
a business (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016, p.61). 
6. Only 2.3% of new business ventures are created in new market niches. This result 
speaks for a relative inability of Greek firms to identify or create new markets, putting 
Greece in the last position in the respective ranking among all innovation-driven 
economies (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, n.d.-b).  
7. A rather small percentage (compared to other innovation-driven economies) of early 
stage entrepreneurs states that their products or services will be either moderately or 
radically innovative. This indicates a low level of innovation in new ventures (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, n.d.-b). 
8. A relatively small percentage (12.3%) of early stage businesses states that they exploit 
entirely new technologies as part of their operations. 60% of early stage entrepreneurs 
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– the highest rate since 2003 for this country – use widely known technologies and/or 
processes (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, n.d.-b).  
Greece’s expert rating is below the European average for almost all indicators for the 
effectiveness of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, namely, cultural and social norms, 
entrepreneurial finance, government policies: support and relevance, government policies: 
taxes and bureaucracy, government entrepreneurship programmes, entrepreneurship 
education at school stage, entrepreneurship education at post school age, commercial and 
legal infrastructure, internal market burdens or entry regulation, and physical infrastructure 
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, n.d.-b). In only one indicator, internal market dynamics, 
defined as “the level of change in markets from year to year” (Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor, n.d.-c), does Greece outperform Europe as a whole.   
Table 4: Greece’s ratings and ranking based on two indexes, the World Bank’s (n.d.) Doing Business 
and the World Economic Forum’s (2016) Global Competitiveness. 
Organisation/index Rating Rank 
World Bank/Doing Business 
(2016 edition)  
68/100 67/190 (World Bank, n.d.) 
World Economic Forum/ 
Global Competitiveness 
(2016 edition) 
4.0/7 81/138 (World Economic 
Forum, 2016, p. xiii ) 
Other studies and indexes  
In late 2016, the German Institute for Economic Research - DIW Econ published a study of the 
status of RDI in Greece, which concluded with the formulation of several policy suggestions. 
The current-state assessment yielded similar (and just as disheartening) results to those of 
reports mentioned earlier (p. 2).  Suggestions included: 
• Above all, the establishment of a national long-term strategy for the development of 
an effective innovation system. This requires national consensus and the development 
of an “institutional memory” beyond the mandate of any single government (p. 66).  
• Problems related to overregulation, legislative instability and non-predictability, 
conflicting legislation, and corruption should be identified and effectively tackled (p. 
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67). Regulatory reforms that will attract investors and support entrepreneurs should 
be undertaken (p. 75).  
• Higher education offered by universities and technical colleges needs qualitative 
improvements and a greater focus on market demand (p.73).  
• A long-term strategy supporting the increase of R&D investments to 3% of GDP should 
be implemented (p.70). 
• The establishment of RDI clusters and networks, both national and international, 
should be facilitated by state initiatives (p.77). 
• The tackling of cultural norms and popular (mis)perceptions that hinder innovation 
entrepreneurship by promoting a vision for a Greek economy that is much more 
innovation-driven (p.79).   
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Figure 3: Greece compared to other EU countries according to various sets of OECD data (OECD, 
n.d.). A value of one corresponds to the best EU performer for each set of data.  
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Interviews 
All interviewees referred to Greek cultural norms as one of the main sources of barriers to the 
establishment of successful innovation ecosystems. The lack of an entrepreneurial culture is 
coupled with an absence of experientially acquired knowledge. USA in general and Silicon 
Valley in particular were provided as examples of the other end of the scale (Kalekos, Lemonis, 
Spyridis). Spyridis pointed out to the fact that SEE and Greece have much in common in this 
respect.  
Interviewees agreed that the Greek labour market is deficient of highly skilled scientists of 
different disciplines, including, notably, software developers. One interviewee (Manglis) 
proposed that it is more of a European than a country-specific problem. Kalekos contested the 
widely-held view that the brain-drain phenomenon is directly relevant to this issue and 
encouraged for further investigation.  On the contrary, Spyridis and Lemonis proposed a direct 
relationship between brain-drain and difficulties in finding talented employees. 
All experts agreed on a negative perception of the Greek state as a facilitator of innovation. 
The reasons are both lack of know-how (Lemonis, Spyridis, Manglis), and, according to 
Lemonis, unwillingness to take action.    
When asked about specific actions that would benefit the Greek innovation ecosystem, all 
interviewees were positive on actions aiming at enhancing entrepreneurial education and 
entrepreneurial intention. Spyridis insisted on the need for the promotion of 
entrepreneurship education in schools; Lemonis, Manglis, and Spyridis were sympathetic to 
the idea of organising soft actions such as business plan competitions in schools. Kalekos 
proposed the establishment of vocational training and qualification schemes that would 
increase the numbers of active software developers.  
Interviewees were also asked whether a specific group of common practices aiming at the 
promotion of innovative startups is effective. This group includes pitching events, the creation 
of co-working spaces, and the establishment of acceleration programmes. Spyridis, Manglis, 
and Lemonis took a positive view, albeit under conditions. Spyridis noted that the 
mushrooming of pitching events could have adverse effects on the ecosystem. Lemonis 
emphasised the need for projects of this type that are initiated by experienced and successful 
members of the startup community. Manglis said that these initiatives should be supported 
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by business angels and venture capital funds, and have a thematic focus depending on their 
location.  
Lemonis, Manglis, and Spyridis agreed on the need to reform Greece’s tax system. Manglis 
and Spyridis insisted on the need to reduce the tax burden. Lemonis’ view, on the contrary, is 
that startups are not particularly concerned with tax issues, since they are typically not 
profitable during their start-up stage. Manglis and Spyridis noted that the failure of the Greek 
state to provide tax incentives to early-stage investors is a major barrier.  All responders stated 
that the Joint European Resources for Micro to medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) programme10 
that supported the development of venture capital funds, was very supportive to the 
innovation ecosystem as a whole.       
4.3 A SWOT analysis of Greece’s innovation system 
A SWOT analysis of Greece’s innovation system will help summarise and complement the 
findings presented so far11. It will also be used to reach conclusions on actions that could 
enhance the country’s performance.   
Strengths (internal factors) 
1.1 Greek SMEs are fairly good innovators.  
1.2 The percentage of highly qualified young Greeks, in particular those that have had 
higher education, is considerable and showing an upward trend.  
1.3 Non-R&D (non high-tech) innovation expenditures are above EU average.  
1.4 The sentiment towards successful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship as a career 
choice is improving among Greeks12.  
1.5 The view that entrepreneurship and innovation are necessary features of the macro 
economy is gaining ground within the Greek society and among policy makers (personal 
                                                     
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/special-support-instruments/jeremie/.  
11 The SWOT analysis is usually conducted in an organizational context; however, it can also be used for other 
entities such as a sector, a region, a country, etc., facing challenges that make an internal and external factors 
analysis relevant (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, 2007). 
12 The positive trend was documented by collating data provided by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Global 
Reports since 2010.  
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communication with Argyris Spyrides (founder of the Innovation Farm) and Angelos 
Manglis (facilitator of the Hellenic Mobile Cluster)).  
1.6 This has resulted in several Greek-state initiatives including legislative measures and 
national support programmes (an example for the former would be Greek national law 
2992 that modernised the rules concerning the operation of VCs and national programmes 
supporting innovation (World Bank Group, 2016).   
Weaknesses (internal factors) 
2.1 The availability of risk capital is exceptionally limited.  
2.2 The same is true for business R&D expenditure.  
2.3 The production of new intellectual assets such as patents is poor.  
2.4 Opportunity-driven entrepreneurship is a small portion of overall entrepreneurship 
activity.  
2.5 Export flows of high-tech product and knowledge-intensive services are anaemic.  
2.6 Greek lacks a national, long-term strategy for the development of an effective 
innovation system. 
2.7 Overregulation, legislative instability and non-predictability deter entrepreneurs and 
investors.  
2.8 Universities and technical colleges are under-financed and are not adequately 
connected to the industry and the market.  
2.9 Cultural norms and popular perceptions that hinder innovation entrepreneurship still 
exist.   
2.10 Intentions for making the step towards starting a business are low and the fear of 
failure is substantial. 
Opportunities (external factors) 
3.1 Greece’s participation in the EU provides it with funding opportunities for projects and 
initiatives that support R&D, innovation, and competitiveness.  
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3.2 Greece’s EU membership, as well as the broader phenomenon of economic 
globalisation, provides it with opportunities concerning the facilitation of mobility (of 
people, enterprises, capital, know-how, etc.) and market access and the development of 
networks among Greek and foreign entities.  
3.3 Software and other intangible assets are becoming more important in the global 
economy; locality and infrastructure are becoming less relevant; businesses are becoming 
more scalable (Banerjee P. et al., 2011; Bersin, 2013; Wolf, 2017). So, for example it is 
imaginable that a small ICT startup may be able to scale up successfully to enter the world 
market in a matter of a few years. In fact, since 2000, Greek mobile marketing firms Velti, 
InternetQ, and Upstream have been partly successful in pursuing their global aspirations 
(Paleologou, 2013).   
3.4 The increasing pace at which innovation is introduced and adopted. New technologies 
emerge to disrupt earlier ones more often than before (Ritholtz, 201713). This can be both 
an opportunity and a threat.   
Threats (external factors) 
4.1 Lack of determination or other types of shortcomings in meeting relevant challenges 
on the part of Greek decision makers.  
4.2 Stagnating or worsening macro-economic conditions.   
4.3 EU budget cuts due to Brexit may influence programmes that support innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Eder & Cooper, 2017).  
4.4 The increasing pace at which innovation is introduced and adopted (see Opportunities 
above).  
4.4 SEE countries as a secondary target market 
While Greece is the primary focus and starting point, the organisation will also pursue to 
undertake activities and be part of projects that have a wider geographical scope. SEE region 
                                                     
13 “Creative destruction caused by technology is so rampant that it is practically a cliché. It is easy to ignore not 
only the speed at which disruption caused by technology is affecting society, but the acceleration in the pace of 
change. This acceleration and its effect on markets, companies and labor is astonishing.” 
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stakeholders (project partners, innovators, researchers, investors, policy makers, etc.) will be 
the main candidates to satisfy this disposition towards openness and extroversion. EI’s 
participation in projects that have a cross-border character will be accomplished: 
• Through cooperation with local agents; 
• By exploiting and building on those agents’ local (country/regional-level) knowledge 
and the benefits of cross-border cooperation.  
There are several reasons for the strategic decision to reach out to SEE countries in particular:  
Common problems and challenges. SEE countries find themselves in a situation similar to 
Greece in a number of ways. They, too, strive to enhance their economies’ competitiveness 
and improve their citizen’s welfare. In large part, they try to achieve this by importing 
successful paradigms of economies that used innovation to drive themselves out of 
stagnation. Repeatedly, the EU and other international entities provide assistance in terms of 
a greater exposure to EU or international good practises. For example, EU’s competitiveness 
and innovation programme presented Albania with opportunities regarding the transfer of 
good practices in supporting entrepreneurship and innovation (European Commission, 2008); 
Bulgaria’s first Innovation Strategy capitalised on know-how provided by the Government of 
the Netherlands (Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Economy, 2005); Serbia used the World 
Bank’s procedures to institute a framework on procurement for innovation (OECD, 2017), etc.  
Economic integration. The interdependency among world economies is growing. The cross-
border movement of goods, services, capital, expertise, information, and other constituents 
of economic activity is constantly increasing. Hence, national borders are becoming less 
relevant than before. Interventions are either adapting to this shift, or even promoting it. One 
good example is the project SEE Link (2015) which is supported by the EBRD. SEE Link has been 
working to connect the equity markets of the SEE starting with those located in Serbia, 
Bulgaria, FYROM, and, then moving on to Greece.  
Financial sustainability. Considerable opportunities for the funding of not-for-profit 
organisations that pursue cross-border projects are available. Several EU Interreg 
programmes fund cooperation projects for the enhancement of the participating countries’ 
competitiveness through improved innovation performance. These include Greece-Albania, 
Greece-Bulgaria, Greece-FYROM, and Balkan MED Interreg programmes (European 
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Commission, n.d.-b). An organisation with a cross-border positioning and track record can 
claim funds for projects that need not be focused on the SEE alone, but may instead have a 
wider geographical outlook. Projects of this kind are funded by the EU (Interreg MED, Interreg 
Europe, Horizon 2020, ENI CBC MED, ENI CBC Black Sea, etc.  programmes), the World Bank, 
the EBRD, etc. In principle, funding diversification is key to financial sustainability.    
4.5 Entrepreneurship and innovation in SEE 
Southeast Europe is meant to indicate a different set of countries in different contexts. For 
this study the countries of interest are the following: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, FYROM, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia.  
This study focuses primarily on Greece, as the main area of interest for the proposed 
organisation. However, a brief discussion on entrepreneurship and innovation for the SEE 
region will also be presented.  
The 2017 European Commission’s Innovation Scorecard includes an assessment of two of 
those countries, i.e. the ones that are members of the EU: Romania and Bulgaria. These 
countries rank at the bottom of the scoreboard, and constitute a category of their own: 
modest innovators. Romania is EU’s worst innovator (European Commission, 2017, p. 64). It 
scores relatively high on measures of its innovation environment and human resources, as 
well as its performance concerning the exports of technological products.  However, Romania 
demonstrates virtually no SME innovation, while firm investment and financing for RDI is 
extremely low. Bulgaria’s relative strengths reside in its good track record concerning the 
production of intellectual property, and in its qualified workforce. On the other hand, 
Bulgarian SMEs are very poor innovators while RDI is poorly financed (p. 43).   
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2017 labels the national economies of FYROM and 
Bulgaria as efficiency rather than innovation-driven (p. 13). Most other EU countries are 
innovation-driven. This indicates both a deficient innovation performance and a lack of 
development in terms of entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
The Global Innovation Index 2017 (Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization) demonstrates that Greece and its neighbourhood SEE countries 
consistently record overall scores below the European average. The index is produced as a 
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composite of several innovation-related indicators such as numbers of patent applications and 
high- and medium-high-tech manufacturers.  
Table 5. Global Innovation Index 2017 scores for SEE countries 
Economy 
Rank/127 
Score 
(0–100) 
European 
average (39 
economies) - 47 
Bulgaria 36 43 
Romania 42 39 
Greece 44 39 
Montenegro 48 38 
Serbia 62 35 
FYROM 61 35 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 86 30 
Albania 93 29 
 
5. The solution: services to end users that mitigate the problem 
5.1 Setting specific and attainable goals  
To identify the goals of the organisation under study (i.e. the direction towards which its 
resources and energies should be channelled), a pairing of internal to external factors affecting 
the Greek entrepreneurial/innovation system will be conducted. It should be noted, however, 
that, since the organisation and its environment change with time, these goals should not be 
viewed as fixed.  
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A method for producing suggestions for initiatives that could enhance Greece’s performance 
is to pair its internal to external factors14 presented to it by its interaction with its 
environment. (Note that not all points are equally important.) Thus, by pairing internal SWOT 
factors 1.2 and 1.4 with external factors 3.1 to 3.4, the following goal has been formulated: 
Goal 1.1: To educate, inspire, and mobilize potential future innovators and investors 
Greece’s highly skilled human capital, is only beginning to see and exploit the opportunities 
offered by the country’s participation in the EU and the new digital economy. This also applies 
to the country’s potential early-stage risk capital providers. In particular, wealthy individuals 
living in developed countries, increasingly offer part of their business expertise, networks, and 
capital to promising entrepreneurial ventures. These individuals, called business angels, tend 
to invest locally and, at times, through networks, called business angels networks. However, 
this institution is not sufficiently developed in Greece. Greece’s early-stage innovation scene 
could benefit greatly from an increase in the numbers of active business angels and the 
amounts of capital and time they are willing to provide.  
By pairing internal factor 1.2 with external factors 3.3 and 3.4 the following goal is devised: 
Goal 1.2: Help young people prepare for the challenges of tomorrow’s changeable 
workplace 
                                                     
14 Mainly strengths with opportunities are paired.  
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Due to innovation and the 
development of a vibrant global 
market for goods and services 
(globalisation), workplace trends have 
become more variable and 
unpredictable than before. Yet it is 
imperative for students and working 
people to make informed decisions. 
Good choices are harder to make, but 
they compensate more. Some 
occupations, such as software 
developers, are now scarce and highly 
valued (European Commission, 
2017c)15, while others, such as 
industrial assemblers, are becoming 
obsolete (U.S. Department of Labor, 
n.d.). As the studies presented in 
section indicate, informed choices not only benefit people who make them, but also foster 
the development of a substantial constituent of every innovation ecosystem.   
Another of the organisation’s goals would be formulated by juxtaposing internal factor 1.5 
with internal factors 3.1 to 3.4:  
Goal 2: Support improvements in policies to unlock the region’s innovation potential   
Greece is now on its way out of the financial crisis. This unhappy adventure seems to have 
made the society, decision-makers, and Greece’s EU partners wiser concerning the 
weaknesses of the country’s productive model. Goal 2 aims at bringing improvements at the 
third of the four pillars of the quadruple helix model constituents, and the one that seems to 
need it the most: the Greek state and regional governments.  
                                                     
15 “More than 40% of business in Europe looking for ICT specialists say they have difficulty finding the right 
people”. 
Figure 4. USA’s information technology workforce 
breakdown and relative size in 1990 and in 2014 (Beckhusen, 
2016, p. 3 for the U.S. Census Bureau). Apparent differences 
speak for both a far greater specialization and technical 
sophistication within the sector as well as its recent soaring 
growth.  
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For reasons of completeness and clarity, Goal 2 is further analysed to the following sub-goals: 
• Identify and transfer good practices from countries that have more advanced 
innovation ecosystems and European innovation hubs.  
• Promote an anticipatory (proactive) approach to regulation about innovation (see 
Hadfield, 2016 for more on this subject). 
• Support a bottom-up approach to the establishment of the legal infrastructure for 
entrepreneurship and innovation – promote further democratisation of the decision-
making process (see section 3.4). 
 
Figure 5. Overarching goal and specific goals of the organisation 
5.2 Activities 
Target audiences and indicative activities for Goal 1.1 (To educate, inspire, and mobilise 
potential future innovators and investors) 
The target audiences for Goal 1.1 include: 
1.1.a Schoolchildren. The goal of reaching out to school children would be to introduce them 
to the fundamentals of entrepreneurship, and, in particular, of innovative entrepreneurship. 
Studies have demonstrated that education programmes on entrepreneurship have increased 
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both entrepreneurial intention16 and the perception of feasibility (Peterman & Kennedy, 
2003). These outcomes seem to be persistent across (although influenced by) the students’ 
cultural and socio‐economic backgrounds and their age groups (Athayde, 2009; Athayde, 
2012). To explain them, various theoretical models have been used including the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour concerning entrepreneurial intention proposed by Ajzen in 1991 (Raposo, 
Smallbone, Balaton & Hortoványi, 2011, p. 96).   
1.1.b Higher education students and researchers working in higher education institutions 
and research institutes. A literature review concerning the post-secondary level education 
bares similar results. Souitaris, Zerbinati & Al-Laham (2007) argue that inspiration endowed 
by entrepreneurial education increases entrepreneurial intentions.  A review by Gorman, 
Hanlon & King (1997) suggests that the acquisition of entrepreneurial knowledge increases 
the likelihood of success for new business ventures. In line with these studies’ findings, Küttim, 
Kallaste, Venesaar & Kiis (2014) note that the success of the programmes depends on their 
characteristics, and highlight the importance of providing hands-on experience and resources, 
such as coaching and networking sessions.  
1.1.c Investors (business angels, crowdfunding campaign participants, etc.). The early-stage 
investment scene is underdeveloped in Greece: a mere 2.7 million euros worth of business 
angels’ investments were recorded during 2015 (CSES, 2012; EBAN, 2016). Experience 
stemming from the facilitation of the Adrion Business Angels Network17 by Atlantis18, points 
to the fact that more should be done in terms of raising awareness, and educating prospective 
early-stage investors.   
An indicative list of activities for reaching Goal 1.1 follows:   
• Discussions and lectures (all audiences; activities tailored to each group) 
• Events bringing young people in contact with successful innovators (1.1.a and 1.1.b)  
• Business plan competitions (1.1.a and 1.1.b) 
• Mentoring and coaching programmes (1.1.b)  
                                                     
16 Souitaris, Zerbinati & Al-Laham (2007) note that intention has “proved to be the best predictor of planned 
behaviour".  
17 https://www.adrionban.gr/?&lang=en  
18 It is recalled that the venture will spin-out from the for-profit company Atlantis Consulting.  
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• Accelerators and courses (1.1.b) 
• Podcasts, videos, other types of digital communication, online tools and resources (all 
audiences; activities tailored to each group) 
It is noted that these activities are compatible with and eligible for grants provided by the 
European Commission. Further relevant information will be provided on the section where 
the organisation’s financial sustainability is discussed.  
Target audiences and indicative activities for Goal 1.2 (help young people prepare for the 
challenges of tomorrow’s changeable workplace) 
The target audiences for Goal 1.2 are young people. A 2003 review by OECD suggests that 
career guidance for young people, in particular, can have somewhat small but consistently 
positive benefits concerning an enhancement of decision-making skills; increased activities 
linked to job exploration; increased intention to educate and train oneself and find work; 
effects on learning outcomes (for further information see also Watts’ 2005 review).  
However, the organisation’s goal is not to provide career guidance per se. Rather, it intends 
to disseminate its specific knowledge on the ways innovation affects the labour market, both 
now and in the foreseeable future. The awareness on the need for this perspective owes much 
to Nesta’s recent work on the challenges of making career decisions in an ever-changing 
labour market. Nesta’s report (Bakhshi, Downing, Osborne & Schneider, 2017) makes the 
following relevant points (among other things): 
• The labour market is occasionally disrupted by changes of various types including 
technological innovations.  
• Innovation affects the labour market in predictable and non-predictable ways. 
• Young people in particular can benefit from a better understanding of the dynamics 
and trends affecting the labour market, including technological changes (pp. 13-16).  
To reach goal 1.2, similar types of activities to those presented in section 0 will be 
implemented. 
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Target audiences and indicative activities for Goal 2 (support improvements in policies to 
unlock the region’s innovation potential)   
2.a Development ministries and other parties responsible for relevant policy instruments 
(regional authorities, municipalities). The government is one of the helixes of the quadruple 
helix model. When governments and the market are imperfect or fail (see sections 3.3 and 
4.5), it is rational for a social enterprise to act as an advocate of social interests (see section 
3.4).   
2.b The general public. In section 4, public attitudes towards entrepreneurship and risk-taking 
were shortly discussed, albeit in a given geographical context. Here, it is noted that this is a 
widespread concern and a deep-rooted phenomenon. According to a report of the World 
Economic Forum (2009), “to a greater or lesser degree in just about every culture there are 
sceptical or even hostile [emphasis added] attitudinal barriers to entrepreneurship” (p. 30).   
To achieve Goal 2 the activities envisaged include:  
• The publishing of reports identifying good practices in public intervention regarding 
innovation across the EU.  
• The organization of roundtables with different types of stakeholders (investors, 
entrepreneurs, policy makers) including stakeholders from more advanced innovation 
ecosystems, such as Holland’s, the Nordic countries’, etc.  
• Activities engaging people in decision-making (issuing calls for ideas, informing the 
public, organizing discussions and online polls).   
• Publishing reports about current trends and the future of labour – supporting the 
development of a skills policy.   
• Actions aiming at integrating entrepreneurship education into primary and secondary 
school curriculum.   
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6. Implementation 
6.1 Funding plan  
The enterprise will largely rely on EU cooperation and research programmes for its financial 
sustainability. For that, it will borrow the parent company’s expertise on the subject.  
In recent years, Atlantis has demonstrated a success rate of about 20% in this kind of proposals 
(i.e. about 20% of the proposals it submitted were successful in obtaining funding). The 
preservation of the success rate above or at this level, will be key to the financial sustainability 
of the spin-off venture.  
Projects funded through EU cooperation programmes 
EU’s funding priorities for the current programming period were formulated according to the 
Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, and analyses and 
suggestions by and for EU’s regions and Member States (European Commission, 2015). EU 
cooperation programmes support projects focusing on issues that the proposed enterprise 
may participate in. Relevant challenges these programmes/projects tackle include 
entrepreneurship and innovation, competitiveness, education and employment, capacity 
building, governance, labour mobility and accessibility, etc.   
Table 6 presents funding opportunities provided by a group of programmes called European 
Territorial Cooperation - Interreg programmes. Call beneficiaries (typically non-for-profit 
private organisations and public bodies) should originate from different Member States and 
are expected to cooperate to reach certain call-specific goals.  
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Table 6. Interreg programmes that issue calls for proposals for which the organisation under study is 
an eligible beneficiary 
Name of 
Interreg 
programme 
Eligible area  Relevant thematics and corresponding budget 
aggregate of national and union support (euros) for 
this programming period 
Programme MED Greece, Member 
States and pre-
accession countries 
bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea 
Innovation (88 M), governance (93 M; European 
Commission - European Regional Development Fund, 
2017a, p.5) 
ADRION Greece, EU Member 
States and pre-
accession countries 
bordering the Ionian 
and Adriatic Sea 
Innovation (23 M), governance (12 M; European 
Commission - European Regional Development Fund, 
2015) 
Balkan MED Greece, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
FYROM  
Entrepreneurship and innovation (14 M; European 
Commission - European Regional Development Fund, 
n.d.-a, p. 81) 
Greece-FYROM Certain parts of 
Greece (incl. 
Thessaloniki) and 
FYROM 
Support for the local economy (18 M; European 
Commission - European Regional Development Fund, 
n.d.-b, p. 91)  
Greece-Bulgaria Certain parts of 
Greece (incl. 
Thessaloniki) and 
Bulgaria 
Competitiveness of SMEs (20 M; European 
Commission - European Regional Development Fund, 
n.d.-c, p. 97) 
 
Horizon 2020 
Horizon 2020 is the biggest EU funding programme for R&D and innovation ever (European 
Commission, n.d.-c). About €30 billion of its budget have been allocated for years 2018 to 
2020. The calls for this period will focus on:  
• Market-creating innovation 
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• Addressing political priorities (such as migration and security) through RDI 
• Strengthening international RDI cooperation 
Most of Horizon 2020 calls for proposals support researchers and innovators directly. 
However, the 2018-2020 work programme also features few, but highly relevant, calls that 
will fund projects that provide support to innovators and the innovation ecosystem. For 
example, the “Startup Europe for Growth and Innovation Radar” call19 will back activities 
aiming at maturing EU’s innovation ecosystems and at increasing the numbers of EU funded 
projects’ results that find their way to the market.   
Other sources of funding  
An important, albeit indirect way to obtain funding from the EU is to provide support to 
programme beneficiaries that lack part of the expertise or resources needed. This is often the 
case with public bodies such as ministries and local authorities. Experience shows that around 
20% to 30% of EU regional cooperation projects’ budget is typically subcontracted. The 
contract is awarded through a formal public call process.    
Other possible sources of funding include Greek state programmes supporting innovation, 
organisations such as the EBRD20 and the World Bank21, and foundations that could support 
projects with a development dimension (see Gouwenberg et al., 2015).   
Competition analysis  
Schematically speaking, in a for-profit context there is competition among enterprises for 
acquiring end-users/customers. It is this organisational function (i.e. customer acquisition) 
that ensures the financial sustainability, and thus the survival, of the entity. Direct competitors 
offer similar products/services to the same market segments.  
However, the envisaged entity will not compete for end-users; primarily, it will compete for 
grants. Its direct competitors will offer similar services to the same end-users and will try to 
do so by obtaining appropriate state funding. Hundreds of entities of different types can (and 
                                                     
19 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/ict-33-2019.html 
20 http://www.ebrd.com/home 
21 http://www.worldbank.org/ 
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do) participate in EU and national programmes, competing for access to the same pool of 
grants that EI aims for. These group of organisations includes business schools, research 
centres, Business Innovation Centres, chambers of commerce, non-for-profit organisations, 
for-profit organisations, municipalities, etc. The following table provides indicative examples 
of recent call results.  
Table 7. Three recent EU call for proposals results 
Programme / Topic Proposals 
submitted 
Proposals 
accepted for 
funding 
Notes 
Horizon 2020 / 
Startup Europe for 
growth – Innovation 
Radar 
66 8 Success rate: 12%. About 330 
applicants; about 40 will receive 
funding (European Commission, 
2017d) 
Balkan MED / 
Entrepreneurship & 
Innovation 
122 17 Success rate: 14%. About 800 
applicants; about 112 will receive 
funding (European Commission -
European Regional Development 
Fund, 2017b) 
Interreg Adrion / 
Innovative and 
Smart Region 
95 14 Success rate: 15%. About 450 
applicants; about 70 will receive 
funding (European Commission -
European Regional Development 
Fund, 2017c).  
 
Quantitative objectives for the funding plan 
A general success rate of 10% to 15% can be anticipated for most calls for proposals EI will 
participate in. Since the authors of EI’s proposals have a proven track record of about 20% (i.e. 
about 20% of the applications for funding/proposals they prepare get funded), this will be the 
success rate to be used for the financial projections provided in section 7.  
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Table 8. Objectives for the funding plan 
Type of output Objective for year one Objective for year five 
Proposals prepared and submitted by 
the EI under various programmes and 
funding schemes 
3 6 
Participation as a partner in proposals 
prepared by a third party 
1 8 
Tender offers submitted in response 
to public calls  
2 4  
Participation in active projects 0 5 
6.2 Operation plan 
Human capital 
Initially, the working staff will consist of: 
• Its shareholders (see Appendix B). They will contribute part-time work for free;  
• One, mid-level consultant working full time.  
Project proposals are either approved or rejected. Approved proposals become projects that 
require a suitable workforce to implement them. In this respect, northern Greece’s labour 
market is an effective pool for the different skills and experience levels (junior, mid, senior) 
required. Employees working for projects backed by the EU can be offered satisfactory 
remunerations. Therefore, the recruitment effort is anticipated to be small. About six people 
are expected to work full time for the enterprise by year five. An important feature of the 
Greek labour market is that it is sufficiently competitive if one considers both labour costs and 
skills.  
Expert advisers will offer their expertise for free during the preparation of a proposal they are 
interested in. Their compensation will come from their participation in approved project ideas 
that reach the implementation stage. Types of advisers will include: members of the academia 
working within the disciplines of innovation and entrepreneurship; people that work for 
organisations that support innovative business ventures such as co-working spaces and 
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accelerators; successful entrepreneurs and corporate managers that are interested in 
mentoring young people and firms.  
The enterprise will use an accountant and a legal adviser as external contractors.   
Location and assets 
During its five-year startup period, the enterprise will co-locate with its parent company. A 
small office that can accommodate up to six work stations will host its operations for this 
period. Two work stations (i.e. a desk and a personal computer) will be fully equipped from 
year one; five employees are expected to staff the organisation by year five.  
6.3 Communication plan 
All EI activities have a communication dimension. This section focuses on activities that aim 
purely on communicating EI’s values, activities, and messages to its stakeholders, mainly its 
target audiences. For a discussion of who EI’s target audiences are, see section 5.  
Newsletters  
EI will create and send a Greek and an English-language newsletter biannually. The newsletter 
recipient list will be set up using these sources: 
• The newsletter recipient list of the parent company (Atlantis). Today Atlantis sends its 
monthly newsletter to about 75,000 recipients in Greece. These recipients are mostly 
SMEs; some are large Greek corporations or Greek branches of multinationals; and 
fewer than 500 are other types of institutions such non-for-profit organisations and 
public services. Atlantis also sends an English-language newsletter to about 500 
recipients in different parts of Europe. The recipients are mostly organisations with 
whom the firm has jointly implement EU-backed projects.  A subgroup will be set up 
to enter the EI newsletter recipient list.    
• Greek, SEE, and EU stakeholders that will be determined through a mapping process. 
• Atlantis’ database on business angel networks and venture capital funds. This list 
contains around 150 European VC funds, and about 10 active Greek VC funds.   
• All new EI contacts will become newsletter recipients if they opt to.  
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Soft communication activities (networking) 
Building a Greek, SEE, and EU-wide network of stakeholders that includes project 
collaborators, beneficiaries (innovators, investors, etc.), policy makers, etc., can be Herculean 
task. One can hardly stress enough the importance of these networks for the type of projects 
EI intends to participate in. Therefore, it is crucial that EI leverages its parent company’s 
contacts, which are considerable.  
Atlantis has a working relationship with hundreds of relevant organisations from across 
Europe:  
• corporates;  
• venture capital fund operators, including all new Greek VCs established in Greece (see 
European Investment Fund, 2016); 
• business angel networks, and the European Business Angel Network (EBAN)22; 
• EU|Business Innovation Centres and their network, EBN23;  
• incubators and accelerators; 
• consulting firms; 
• chambers of commerce; 
• regional and state authorities; 
EI will use Atlantis’ personal contacts to engage relevant entities where necessary. This, for 
example, would be a project where: corporates mentor innovative SMEs; SMEs meet policy 
makers; innovators meet investors; etc.  
Other communication activities 
Similarly, EI will use Atlantis’ contacts in general and specialised media to write articles and 
give interviews regarding its activities. It will also pursue to participate in conferences and 
workshops that help it reach its target audiences and raise its profile. Further, it will create a 
website, a blog (integrated in the website) and social media accounts. The blog will host 
articles written by EI’s advisory team (see section 6.2) and distinguished members of the 
                                                     
22 http://www.eban.org/ 
23 https://ebn.eu/  
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entrepreneurial ecosystem. The organisation website will have a central, unifying role. It will 
function as a hub, providing links to every activity, event, and communication channel (Figure 
6).  
 
Figure 6. EI’s website’s unifying function 
 Communication activities within state-backed projects  
Both operationally and financially, the envisaged entity will build itself around projects backed 
by EU, national, and other sources (see section 6.1). This dominance of project over process 
functions will also be manifest in its communication with its stakeholders. A comprehensive 
communication plan is a core component of virtually every project EI will undertake. 
Communication activities carried out within projects promote both the project itself and the 
organisation(s) implementing it. These project-specific communication plans typically include 
activities that are often well-funded and high-profile: 
• Events of different types such as workshops, seminars, conferences, discussions; 
• Brochures, posters, information leaflets; 
• Reports, journal articles, articles in the press and digital media, booklets, other 
publications and educational material; 
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• A project website, project social media accounts; 
• Email newsletters to all stakeholders.  
Quantitative objectives of the communication plan 
Table 9. Objectives of the communication plan 
Type of output Objective for year one Objective for year five 
Newsletter Biannual; sent to 500 
recipients 
Quarterly; sent to 1,000 
recipients 
Interviews in the media 
(television, radio, 
newspapers, websites, etc.) 
5 25 
Publishing of articles  5 15 
Organisation website 1 1 
Organisation social media 
accounts 
1 3 
Organisation YouTube 
channel 
0 1 
Project events  0 15 
Project websites 0 4 
 
6.4 Ownership and management 
EI will be established in Greece, within the framework of this country’s national law. In this 
context, it will be registered as a civil-law non-for-profit enterprise. Within the conceptual 
framework provided in Table 2, the entity is to be considered a hybrid non-for-profit venture. 
This is so because it will not only rely on obtaining passive funding by the state and other 
sources, but it will also pursue to expand its revenue streams by providing services to public 
and private entities as well (see p. 43).  
It should have become clear by now that this venture relies heavily on tangible and intangible 
resources provided by its parent company, Atlantis Consulting. In fact, Atlantis and EI will be 
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strongly related through ownership. Technically, EI will not be a subsidiary of Atlantis. 
However, the two people holding around 90% of Atlantis and its management will 
cumulatively owe about 67% of EI (33,3% each). The author of this study – an Atlantis 
employee at the time of writing – will hold the rest one third of the enterprise and oversee its 
day-to-day operations. The three people owning the enterprise will constitute EI’s board of 
directors. The formal requirements of the law concerning the positions of each member of the 
board (president, secretary, etc.) will be fulfilled accordingly. 
After year three to four, a de facto separation of the functions of implementing projects and 
applying for funding of project ideas (i.e. submitting proposals) will be reflected in the 
functional separation between these two programme areas. Different members of the staff 
will head each programme. A third programme area concerning marketing and 
communication will be established when the enterprise expands further.  
7. Financial projections – financial sustainability 
7.1 Revenues  
For a period of about one year, it is forecasted that no grants or other sources of income24 will 
be available. The following table uses the projections of Table 8 and estimates concerning 
success rates and time intervals between milestones to produce a revenue forecast for the 
initial five-year period.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 In the financial analysis that follows, government grants are treated as income. 
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Table 10. Projected revenues 
 
Sources of 
revenue Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Notes 
A1.1 
Proposals 
prepared and 
submitted by the 
EI under various 
programmes and 
funding schemes 4 6 6 6 6 
Submissions are considered 
to take place at regular 
intervals within each year.  
A1.2 
Number of those 
accepted for 
funding  
0.20 0.80 1.20 1.20 1.20 
A success rate of 20% is 
anticipated.  The notion of 
expected value is used: 
(number of 
proposals*success rate). A 
time lag of about eight 
months from submission of 
proposal to grant 
agreement is forecasted. 
A1.3 
Expected income 
(euros) 
0 15,000 75,000 150,000 180,000 
The first instalment is 
released one year after the 
grant agreement. The 
second and last instalment 
is released two years after 
the grant agreement. 
150,000 euros worth of 
revenue collected for each 
project. 
A2.1 
Participation as a 
partner in 
proposals 
prepared by a 
third party 
6 8 8 8 8 
As in A1.1 
A2.2 
Number of those 
accepted for 
funding  
0.13 0.78 1.04 1.04 1.04 
A success rate of 13% is 
anticipated. As to the 
remainder, similarly to 
A1.2. 
A2.3 
Expected income 
(euros) 0 8,450 59,150 118,300 135,200 
As in A1.3 
A3.1 
Tender offers 
submitted in 
response to 
public calls 
2 2 3 3 4 
  
A3.2 
Expected income 
(euros) 
0 9,600 9,600 14,400 14,400 
Revenues received in one 
instalment, one year after 
the tender has been issued. 
12% success rate, 40,000 
euros worth of revenue 
collected for each project. 
  
Total annual 
revenue (euros) 0 33,050 143,750 282,700 329,600   
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7.2 Costs 
To cut costs and capitalise on possible synergies, EI will be co-located with its parent company, 
in Atlantis’ 2,000 square metre headquarters office. Over the period considered, it is 
envisaged that it will rent its office through an “as a service” business model agreement. 
Atlantis will sublet a small, 50 square metre furnished office space, along with the following 
services: 
• heating, cooling and ventilation,  
• cleaning services, 
• wired and wireless broadband internet access, 
• access to six telephone lines and to the company’s telephone centre,  
• access to the corporation’s professional printers, a small kitchen, a dining room, and 
toilets.  
The overall service will be provided at cost, for a fee of 800 euros per month. It will be offered 
on a two-year credit (grace) period.  
Upfront investment in assets will be particularly low. Two mid- range laptops and a standard 
office software suite will be purchased to equip the office space. During the (estimated) one-
year pre-revenue period,  
• the shareholders will contribute part-time work for free;  
• EI will have just one, mid-level consultant on its payroll.  
The tables that follow provide a projection of the operating costs involved. 
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Table 11. A projection of employment costs 
  Personnel list   
Year 1 
(number of 
employees) Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
B1 Junior-level consultants   0 1 2 2 2 
B2 Mid-level consultants   1 1 1 1 1 
B3 Senior consultants   0 0.5 1 1 1 
B4 Accountants (in-house)   0 0 1 1 1 
B5 Administative assistant   0 0 1 1 1 
  Total staff count   1 3 6 6 6 
  
Payroll cost per category 
(euros) 
Company 
cost per 
employee 
per year 
Year 1 
(company 
cost) Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
B7 Junior-level consultants 15,600 0 15,600 31,512 31,824 32,136 
B8 Mid-level consultants 22,800 22,800 23,028 23,258 23,491 23,726 
B9 Senior consultants 36,000 0 18,000 36,360 36,724 38,193 
B10 Accountants (in-house) 15,600 0 0 15,600 15,756 16,386 
B11 Administative staff 14,400 0 0 14,688 14,400 14,544 
 Total staff cost   22,800 56,628 121,418 122,194 124,985 
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Table 12. A projection of other operational costs 
  Types of expenses Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Notes 
C1 Rent as a service 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 
This expense will not 
impose any cash-flow 
burdens on the 
organisation until year 2. A 
two-year credit period has 
been agreed with the 
parent company. 
C2 Courier services 200 300 600 600 600   
C3 
Telecommunications 
(mobile phones) 500 1,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
All telecommunication 
expenses other than those 
related to mobile 
communication is included 
in D1. 
C4 Travel expenses  1,000 2,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 
Travel expenses will 
increase considerably when 
EI starts to implement 
cross-border collaboration 
projects. 
C5 
Legal support 
services 300 600 800 1,100 1,100   
C6 
External accounting 
support services 1,100 1,400 2,000 2,000 2,000   
C7 
Office suite 
(software as a 
service) 126 315 756 756 756   
C8 
Cloud ERP and CRM 
system (as a service) 0 400 400 400 400 
To reduce startup costs, no 
ERP and CRM applications 
will be used during the first 
year. 
C9 
Depreciation and 
amortisation 100 200 350 350 350 
7 laptops in total. Printers, 
furniture and other 
equipment are used as a 
service.  
C10 Contingencies  1,407 1,754 2,797 2,833 2,833 
Contingencies equal to 12% 
of total operating expenses 
disregarding payroll 
expenses.  
 Total 13,133 16,369 26,103 26,439 26,439   
 
7.3 Pro forma statement of activities 
The pro forma statement of activities25 presented below provides insights on the financial 
sustainability of the venture. The positive values in years four and five indicate of a healthy financial 
outlook.  
                                                     
25 This statement is the equivalent of the pro forma profit and loss statement prepared for for-profit entities.  
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Table 13. Pro forma statement of activities 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
D1 Total Revenue  0 33,050 143,750 282,700 329,600 
D2 
Total operating 
expenses (D3+D4) 
35,933 72,997 147,521 148,633 151,423 
D3 Payroll 22,800 56,628 121,418 122,194 124,985 
D4 
Other operating 
expenses 
including rent 13,133 16,369 26,103 26,439 26,439 
D5 Interest  0 0 0 0 0 
D6 Depreciation  100 200 350 350 350 
D7 Tax (29%)  0 0 0 38,778 51,570 
D12 
Change in net assets 
(D1-D2-D5-D6-D7)  
-36,033 -40,147 -4,121 94,939 126,257 
 
 A sensitivity analysis reveals that the major threat to the financial sustainability of EI is the 
risk of not being able to submit an appropriate number of project proposals. This could be the 
case if, for example, the number of calls for proposals EI is eligible for is smaller than 
anticipated. Since employment costs are a major part of total operating costs, this risk can be 
effectively mitigated by a prudent hiring strategy.  
7.4 A calculation of startup funding requirements 
The pro forma cash flow statement provided below, provides an estimate of the additional 
cash requirements the organisation will need to operate during its initial five-year period.  
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Table 14. Pro forma cash flow statement 
    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Notes 
A. Change in net assets   -36,033 -40,147 -4,121 94,939 126,257 
Change in net assets 
corresponds to the 
concept of net profit 
in a for-profit context.  
B. Capital expenditure 
  500 500 750 0 0 
Purchase of 
equipment. 
C. Depreciation 
expenses 
  100 200 350 350 350 
  
D. Changes in non-cash 
working capital 
(D1*D2) 
  0 4,958 16,605 20,843 7,035 
Each year, 15% of 
annual change in sales 
is estimated to be 
witheld as working 
capital. 
D1. Change in 
sales 
  0 33,050 110,700 138,950 46,900 
  
D2. Non-cash 
working capital / Sales 
(%) 15% 
          
  
E. Principal payments   0 0 0 0 0   
F. New debt issued 
and/or deferred 
payments  
  
8,400 8,400    
This corresponds to 
the two-year credit 
offered by the parent 
company regarding 
the payment of rents.  
G1. Free cash flow per 
year (A-B+C-D-E+F) 
  -28,033 -37,004 -21,126 74,446 119,572 
  
G2. Free cash flow, 
cumulative 
  -28,033 -65,037 -86,163 -11,717 107,855 
  
Η. Additional funding 
required 
90,000   
      
I.1 Available cash per 
year, considering H 
  61,967 -37,004 -21,126 74,446 119,572 
  
I.2 Available cash, 
cumulative, 
considering H 
  61,967 24,963 3,837 78,283 197,855 
  
 
Grants or other sources of income do not produce sufficient amounts of free cash flow until 
year four. This creates a funding gap. To cover it, EI’s shareholders have two options: 
• The favoured option is to borrow from a financial institution. The grant agreement (i.e. 
the contract between the subsidising agency and EI) is occasionally considered by the 
bank as a type of collateral. However, this option will not be available before some 
proposals are approved for funding.   
• Otherwise, EI will have to borrow from its owners.  
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8. Conclusions 
Clearly, there are market and government failures that would justify interventions aiming at 
strengthening the quadruple helix innovation ecosystem of Greece and neighbouring SEE 
countries. There is considerable degree of consensus among stakeholders and researchers on 
the absence of a properly developed entrepreneurial culture on the one hand, and expertise 
on developing successful innovation ventures on the other. Furthermore, the development of 
skills policies adopted to the requirements of the modern, innovation-driven, and integrated 
global markets is a pressing need. A suitably focused organisation aiming at tackling these 
issues, is a minor but, nevertheless, rational response.   
The organisation can be economically viable for a period of five-plus years, providing a startup 
funding gap of 90,000 euros can be overcome. Its operational viability is supported by an 
experienced team of founders and advisers with a proven track record of relevant expertise. 
Another important feature that helps make this venture viable, is the competitive labour costs 
of the Greek workforce given its qualifications and skills.   
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10. Appendix A: Transcripts of interviews  
10.1 Thanasis Kalekos 
Interviewee: Thanasis Kalekos 
Date of interview: 28/1/2018 
Duration: 29’ 
Type of interview: Semi-structured; discussion over the telephone.   
Mr. Thanasis Kalekos, (aka A.K.) is a Managing Partner of Odyssey Venture Partners, a venture 
capital fund focusing on IT ventures originating in Greece. According to his executive profile 
in Bloomberg26,  
Mr. Kalekos has has thirty years of executive management and venture capital 
experience. Mr. Kalekos' s operating experience spans product R&D, marketing, general 
management, corporate officer and Chief Executive Officer responsibilities with 
Computervision, Xerox, Mentor Graphics, Cadence Design Systems, CoWare and 
Conformiq, Inc. He joined Cadence during its pre-revenue stage in 1985 and left in 1997. 
Mr. Kalekos was a General Partner at Telos Venture Partners, where he focused on the 
emerging internet market opportunities for business to consumer and business to 
business solutions as well as the technologies that enabled the internet infrastructure. He 
invested in and held board positions in companies like: Khimetrics, Conduct, VPNX, 
Intraspect, Coventor, Theta Microelectronics, and YY Technologies among others. Mr. 
Kalekos holds a BSEE degree from Lafayette College and an MSEE degree from Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute.  
Interviewer: In your opinion, which are the main barriers startups face (two or more; elaborate) 
AK: Lack of knowledge and expertise. Absence of an entrepreneurial culture. Lack of 
experiences of the kind the Silicon Valley would provide. These experiences are attained by 
                                                     
26 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=225230135&privcapId=22520564
4&previousCapId=225205644&previousTitle=Odyssey%20Venture%20Partners  
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working on a company that develops products and introduces them to the market. In Greece 
we hear more of what is being said in the media. A state aid mentality has been established.  
An interdependence between businesses and the state exists. People like to think that the 
government will give them jobs.   
I: Which recent public interventions have been fruitful in helping the Greek innovation 
ecosystem? Why/how? 
AK: Finance for VCs is critical. VCs need to be independent. VCs are independent entities that 
can support startups effectively. The “give away money” mentality of the state cannot deliver 
the expected results.  
 I: Which recent public interventions have been fruitful in helping the Greek innovation 
ecosystem? Why/how? 
AK: The Jeremie funds were helpful. Our fund acquired money from the EU, Greece, and 
private sources. There were some setbacks that we should deal with. TANEO was helpful; the 
equity fund was also helpful.  
I: Which were not? Why/how? 
AK: Giving away money to enterprises does not help. ICT4Growth (a national programme for 
the financial support of projects implemented by ICT SMEs-ed.) is an example of this. It is not 
healthy.  
I: Do innovative SMEs/startups find it difficult to find people with the right skills? If yes, what 
kind of (hard and/or soft) skills do they need more of? (as employees) 
AK: There is a serious issue with the scarcity of IT developers.  
I: Is it brain-drain? 
AK: This is not the primary issue. We don’t know if this is an issue at all. We should look at the 
numbers. How many leave Greece now, how many did this before the financial crisis.  
We have a tough time finding good scientists. A study on this would be worth the effort. There 
are too many scientists that could work in private hi-tech firms. Instead, they give private 
lessons to schoolchildren. They should be educated (educate themselves) to be able to work 
for productive activities. They could be trained as IT developers, for example.  
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[A discussion over actions that could help the ecosystem followed] 
AK: It would be very productive if we could develop courses for the training and certification 
of educated people such as mathematicians, physicists, biologists, etc. A database could be 
used to connect corporations with qualified professionals. These kind of programmes can be 
used to enhance the prospects of employees to find a job in the industry.  
The efficiency of reports depends on their quality. Activities aiming at educating 
schoolchildren are promising. Culture should be cultivated early; even as early as during high-
school. The issue of education and skills should also be addressed at this stage. We should not 
only focus on soft activities. Cultural issues are long-term problems. We should also think 
about short-term solutions as well.  
It can be helpful if stakeholders would meet and discuss about issues; but they should be able 
to do this on their own.  
10.2 Giorgos Lemonis 
Interviewee: Georgios Lemonis 
Date of interview: 23/1/2018 
Duration: 32’ 
Type of interview: semi-structured; in-person discussion; answers recorded by taking notes.  
Mr. Lemonis is a serial entrepreneur and expert on startup strategy. To date, he counts two 
successful exits. He has contributed to the annual “Doing Business” report of The World Bank 
for four years, he is a columnist and the mentor of three festival winning startups, including 
two in the Pioneers Festival.     
Interviewer: In your opinion, which are the main barriers startups face (two or more; elaborate) 
GL: Access to finance is a major problem for startups. Tax rates and the legislative environment 
are continually changing. Huge delays in the completion of judicial processes. Investors do not 
know in advance what they will be up against. They may not be able to receive justice. High 
tax rates are not a serious problem. Startups are not profitable for a long time. However, 
excessive social insurance costs are a big problem for small businesses.  
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I: Which recent public interventions have been fruitful in helping the Greek innovation 
ecosystem? Why? 
GL: Jeremie funds. The funds that will be established through the equity fund. However, the 
funds that operate in Greece are too small. The inject capital in the range of 50.000 to 100.000 
as pre-seed finance. This is not enough for ambitious ventures that need to make R&D 
investments. Equifund27 is also a positive initiative.  
The establishment of a new type of company, the Private Company (ΙΚΕ in Greek-ed.) is 
another positive initiative.  
I: Which were not? Why? 
GL: Grants provided by the Greek government to startups should be front-loaded. There is no 
point in providing grants after the invoices have been paid. Also, larger sums of money are 
needed. Except the problems I mentioned earlier, I should also mention the lack of political 
stability, bureaucracy, and the direct and indirect costs associated with operating a business.  
I: Do innovative SMEs/startups find it difficult to find people with the right skills? If yes, what 
kind of (hard and/or soft) skills do they need more of? 
GL: Sure. In the US one (IT -ed.) developer cost the same amount of money that five Greek 
developers cost in total. However, they are better – more skilled. Our developers lack the 
experience. The ecosystem is immature. And brain-drain is, of course, an issue. We cannot 
provide competitive remuneration.    
[an open discussion on activities that would have a beneficial effect on the ecosystem 
followed] 
GL: Events bringing stakeholders together can be beneficial; however, this depends on who 
represents the ecosystem. Is it failed, former entrepreneurs? The way this is implemented is 
what is important. 
Children want to hear about entrepreneurship. Business plan competitions, educational 
workshops for students, etc. are all good ideas. Talking to young people has been among the 
                                                     
27 See https://www.espa.gr/el/Pages/EquiFund.aspx [in Greek].  
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most fulfilling experiences of my life. There are members of the startup community that can 
and want to give something back. Some of them become mentors, and this is great. Its nice 
and it works nice when mentors are interested in supporting others, and Greece.  
Accelerators can be helpful. But one should be careful. They can be helpful if the 
coachers/mentors are effective and knowledgeable.  
Co-working spaces have the perks of small spaces. They are cheap, they provide opportunities 
for discussions among startups. They are helpful.  
Pitching events are ok. 
10.3 Angelos Manglis 
Interviewee: Angelos Manglis  
Date of interview: 23/1/2018 
Duration: 30’ 
Type of interview: semi-structured; in-person discussion; answers recorded by taking notes.  
Mr. Manglis gave this interview with his capacity as the co-founder and facilitator of the 
Hellenic Mobile Cluster28, a cluster of the biggest companies involved in the development of 
mobile applications.  
I: In your opinion, which are the main barriers innovative SMEs face in Greece (two or more; 
elaborate) 
AM: The Greek market is a small one.  
There are no motives for business angels’ investments. Bureaucracy; even funding 
programmes for SMEs are more complicated and bureaucratic than those set up by other EU 
countries such as Italy.  
Not enough financing tools.  
There are no big corporates. Corporates produce ecosystems.  
Greece is a peripheral country. This means that, for example, we are not eligible for 
participating in Kickstarter campaigns. Even flights are inconvenient. In Turkey, Germany, 
Holland, things are different.  
                                                     
28 See http://www.hamac.gr/default90c3.html?lang=en-GB&page=2  
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Capital controls have created lots of problems.  
The Greek geography is also an issue. It is difficult to innovate if you are located in a Greek 
island, for example.  
We need experienced executives and professionals. We need executives that excel in 
marketing and strategy, for instance. 
I: Which recent public interventions have been fruitful in helping the Greek innovation 
ecosystem? Why? 
AM: Equifund is a positive step. National funding programmes are problematic. Support for 
visiting international exhibitions, such as the one in Barcelona (i.e. the Mobile World 
Congress29), have a positive effect. It is a good thing that people are no longer being recruited 
to the public sector. This used to be a terrible brain-drain during the ‘80s. 
I: Which were not? Why? 
AM: The increase in the tax burden; changes in income taxation legislation; increases in 
indirect taxes; capital controls; the 2015 political and financial derailment; bureaucracy;  
failure to support angel investing.   
I: Do innovative SMEs/startups find it difficult to find people with the right skills? If yes, what 
kind of (hard and/or soft) skills do they need more of? 
AM: This is a problem that is not country-specific. It’s an EU problem. In Greece the 
remuneration is too low. Talented people leave the country. Employees working for Greek 
firms don’t have the chance to develop their skills. Unemployed people fall to the 
unemployment trap. The longer they stay unemployed the more difficult it is for them to find 
a job. 
[a discussion on activities that would have a beneficial effect on the ecosystem followed] 
AM: Events bringing stakeholders together to discuss problems of the ecosystem is not very 
helpful. People tend to blame one another.  
Accelerators can be helpful. We need more of those. Accelerators that have a thematic focus 
are a good idea. For example, in Larissa we could have an accelerator that focuses on farming 
innovation, etc. We need to bring business angels and VCs into such schemes. An we need to 
give investors more motives. In Turkey, tax incentives transformed the innovation scene 
completely.  
Co-working spaces don’t support startups unless they are part of an acceleration programme.  
There is a need for a business education in schoolchildren. Children under 16 respond well to 
activities bringing them in contact with the business world. Business plan contests are an 
interesting activity for students of this age.   
                                                     
29 See https://www.mobileworldcongress.com/.  
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Programmes where prospective mentors are trained will not have a major impact; however, 
they can be helpful.  
There is one activity that can have a tremendous effect on the ecosystem. We can send teams 
to accelerators taking place abroad (in Amsterdam, London, the Silicon Valley, etc.). Links will 
be created. They will bring great experiences back to Greece. A few years ago, Ms. 
Diamantopoulou (a former Greek Minister for Education -ed.) did just that. But it was 
discontinued.  
10.4 Argyris Spyridis 
Interviewee: Argyris Spyridis 
Date of interview: 25/1/2018 
Duration: 31’ 
Type of interview: semi-structured; a discussion over the telephone; answers recorded by 
taking notes.  
Mr. Spyridis has more than two decades of experience as a coach and mentor for startups and 
SMEs. He is a co-founder of Innovation Farm, providing support to startups. He is active in the 
different programmes such as the StageOne Accelerator for early/idea stage startups, the 
StageTwo Accelerator, an acceleration programme focusing on market strategy and access to 
finance, Thessaloniki Innohub, Mentor’s mix, a programme for training new mentors that will 
support the innovation ecosystem, ICT2B, the SuperFounders, and the Balkan Venture 
Forum’s Venture Academy.   
I: In your opinion, which are the main barriers startups face in Greece (two or more; elaborate) 
AS: Access to finance is one major problem. However, it may not be the biggest one. Most of 
the times, it is about the team itself. They need to be capable enough to move the project 
forward, develop a business model, develop a prototype, develop a strategy, establish 
positioning. They are immature. They have a hard time understanding what they need to do 
to be ready for risk finance.  
I: Why is that? 
AS: To some degree, it is an ecosystem problem. Southeast Europe countries face the same 
challenges. It is an internal problem. A problem of (lack of -ed.) entrepreneurial culture. 
Opportunities for experiential learning are very poor. There are no mentors or business angels. 
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Good business angel networks can have a catalytic effect on the ecosystem. Poor business 
angel networks are like bad quality gasoline. The concept of 3f – friends, family, and fools 
(early investors -ed.) is critical. In the Balkans these relationships are not that supportive of 
innovative ventures. The culture is not helpful.  
These cultural issues are a barrier towards the development of more innovations. For 
example, in Greece and in other southeast European countries, we have a difficult time 
separating our personal/family lives from our firm’s activities.  
I: In your opinion, which are the main barriers innovative SMEs face in Greece (two or more; 
elaborate) 
AS: SMEs are very different. There is some entrepreneurial culture. SMEs used to be the 
backbone of the Greek economy. However, there is no real startup-innovation mentality. In 
the US it is different. It is in their DNA. We don’t teach Greek students about exits. Not yet.   
I: Which recent public interventions have been fruitful in helping the Greek innovation 
ecosystem? Why? 
Increased taxation affects everything. Crowdfunding is considered income. National 
programmes for supporting startups are not in line with their needs. For example, they require 
that the startup does not move its headquarters away from Greece for a number of years. 
Jeremie funds were helpful. There were no successors. This had a very adverse effect on the 
ecosystem. Startups cannot grow without continuous support.  
I: Which were not? Why? 
National programmes that support innovative ventures require that you already have some 
capital. Most startups do not.  
There are no tax incentives for business angels. Business angel networks are very 
underdeveloped. They are unable to guide and educate investors. HEBAN30 and a few others 
are trying to do this.   
                                                     
30 See http://www.heban.gr/.  
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I: Do innovative SMEs/startups find it difficult to find people with the right skills? If yes, what 
kind of (hard and/or soft) skills do they need more of? 
This is a major issue. There is no human capital. People rarely support the ventures. They want 
to become employees from day one. Also, everybody wants to be the leader (although this 
problem is smaller than before). Universities’ initiatives for providing business education are 
irrelevant and inadequate. Young people migrate. The ecosystem is underdeveloped; it cannot 
keep them.  
[a discussion on activities that would have a beneficial effect on the ecosystem followed] 
Pitching events do have a positive impact on the ecosystem. But this is long-term. There is an 
educational element to them. The help the ecosystem mature.  
Accelerators have a positive impact, too. They, too, should be viewed with a long-term 
perspective.  
Co-working spaces for startups do help early-stage startups. In Thessaloniki, we could use 
more. There is only one. A small one.  
I: What about these types of activities, could they be of help? 
• Educational workshops that encourage students, researchers and young professionals 
to adopt a positive approach to entrepreneurship 
• Business plan competitions for students 
• Events bringing young people in contact with successful innovators (either coming from 
Greece or from abroad) 
They can. But what would be more so is to introduce entrepreneurship as a subject to be 
taught, in primary schools in particular. Not a difficult one. Just a very good introduction to 
the concepts. Students should be aware what profit is, for instance. We (i.e. society -ed.) are 
not aware of fundamental concepts.   
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11. Appendix B: The founding team  
The executive profiles of the founding team members are reproduced under kind permission. 
President: Angelos Manglis 
Angelos is the founder and VP of ATLANTIS Consulting. He holds an MSc in “Technical Change 
& Industrial Strategy” from PREST Institute of the University of Manchester and a Bachelor’s 
Degree in Civil Engineering from the Democritus University of Thrace. Throughout his long-
term experience counting over a 25-year time period engaging in RDI project management 
and his contribution to the formation of strategies for technology and business development, 
he has developed a portfolio of strong working relationships and contacts with many high tech 
and IT companies, as well as policy makers globally. He is an honorary member of the HAMAC 
Association and the facilitator of the Hellenic Mobile Cluster. He is the coordinator of MOBIP 
and EMINVEST EU-backed projects aiming at supporting the competitiveness of high growth 
businesses in the mobile services sector.  
CEO: Christos Grapsas 
Christos holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering from the Democritus University of 
Thrace. Since 2009 he has been working with ATLANTIS Consulting in analysing technological 
developments, preparing feasibility studies, studying legislation-related issues, supervising 
teams, and managing important projects. His area of expertise is assessing and supporting 
green and innovative investments. He now leads the Innovation Management and Funding 
Department. He has full professional proficiency in English. Christos attends the MBA 
programme at IHU.  
Secretary: Grigorios Kalamakidis 
Grigoris is the president of ATLANTIS. He holds a Bachelor's Degree from the Democritus 
University of Thrace majoring in Industrial Electronics, Automation Control Systems and 
Management of Power Energy Systems. He attended graduate studies at Bradford University 
in the United Kingdom for acquiring an MSc diploma in Power Electronics Engineering. He has 
extensive experience regarding the financing of investments by public-state programmes. He 
has been an appointed expert for the monitoring and evaluation of various subsidy EU and 
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national subsidy schemes. He is the author of several reports on SMEs competitiveness such 
as the final Report of the project "Realization of the Action for the Increase of Competitiveness 
in SMEs at the Region of Eastern Macedonia – Thrace (Prefecture of Drama), in the fields of 
ARGE 28 Program for the Enlargement of E.C. with Countries of Central and Eastern Europe – 
Clothing Sector, 2003, and others.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
